survey series has continued to grow. The last 12 months have seen two further developments. First, the Nuffield Foundation and the Policy Planning and Research Unit (PPRU) of the Northern Ireland Office have provided funds for three years to enable us to extend the British Social Attitudes survey to Northern Ireland. The two versions of the questionnaire have much in common; but together with colleagues at PPRU and the Policy Research Institute (PRI) of The Queen's University, Belfast and the University of Ulster, we have developed and fielded in 1989 a special series of questions on prejudice and discrimination. This questionnaire module was, of course, fielded alongside standard BSA questions, allowing us to compare the attitudes of the British and the Northern Irish public on a wide range of issues. Preliminary results will be presented and discussed in The 7th Report.

Second, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has provided a grant over a four-year period to SCPR and to Nuffield College, Oxford, to set up a Joint Unit for the Study of Social Trends (JUSST). The Unit's programme has many components, including a large-scale panel study in which respondents from the 1987 British Social Attitudes survey will be reinterviewed in 1991; methodological work to develop new measuring instruments of social and political attitudes (also linked to the BSA series); and support for future rounds of the ISSP surveys. The links between SCPR and our colleagues at Nuffield College have already been very fruitful, and we welcome the opportunity provided by the Joint Unit for strengthening them.

As we announced last year, we are also preparing the publication of a cumulative Sourcebook, sponsored by Shell UK Ltd, of British Social Attitudes findings. It will be both a companion volume to the annual BSA Report, and a 'stand-alone' reference book with trend data on well over a thousand attitudinal items. The first Sourcebook will now be published (by Gower) in 1990, so that trend information from 1983 to 1989 can be included.

As the survey series develops year by year, we rely more and more on the help of our colleagues within SCPR and on their tolerance of its increasing demands. In particular, we should like to thank Rosemary Peddar and Jude Lewis for their help in organising this year's ISSP conference in London. We are also indebted to the staff of the ZentralArchiv in Cologne for their work in preparing the ISSP data and making it available through their Codebooks; and to all our other colleagues in the International Social Survey Programme without whose generous co-operation this Report could not have appeared. The responsibility for its contents, however, remains our own.

1 Measuring national differences

An introduction to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

James A. Davis and Roger Jowell*

It is said that Britain is a peculiarly class-conscious society, and that statistics prove it. For instance, as many as 56 per cent of British adults agree with the proposition that there are inherent conflicts between workers and management. But is that a high proportion? Is it a very high proportion? All we can really say is that it is a narrow majority. Statistics of this sort, even when buttressed by similar findings, tell us very little about any society - not on their own at any rate. They certainly do not tell us whether the British public regards class differences as especially important.

By inserting the word "especially" into that last sentence we have insinuated the notion of relativity. When people casually refer to, say, the Italians as volatile, or the French as stylish, or the British as stand-offish (we have chosen only the most polite national stereotypes here), the word "especially" is implicit in front of each of these adjectives. Italians would not be characterised as being so volatile if, say, the British and others did not see themselves as so phlegmatic. Similarly, when people refer to the Germans as punctilious, they may well be alluding in large part to implicit shortcomings of other European nations.

National stereotypes are, of course, shameless caricatures based partly on observation, partly on hearsay, and partly (perhaps mostly) on prejudice.

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BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES

They serve to exaggerate rather than to describe differences between countries and, as a by-product, to promote the patently false notion that nations vary more in their personalities and attitudes than individuals do.

The first modest aim of the International Social Survey Programme is to replace such national stereotypes with well-grounded facts and figures. The second, longer-term and more ambitious aim is to try to make more sense of the differences we do uncover. This book attempts only to begin to fulfil the first aim.

What is the ISSP?

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a voluntary grouping of study teams in eleven nations (soon to become thirteen or fourteen), each of which undertakes to run a short, annual self-completion survey containing an agreed set of questions asked of a probability-based, nationwide sample of adults. The topics change from year to year by agreement, with a view to replication every five years or so.

The questions themselves are developed by subgroups and then thrashed out at an annual meeting attended by representatives of each national team. At the last meeting in May 1989, in London, there were 29 participants from the 11 national teams, including representatives from the ISSP’s ‘official’ data archive, the ZentralArchiv at the University of Cologne. (Lists of the participating national teams, of the subjects of modules run so far, and of those scheduled until 1991 are given at the end of this chapter.)

A constitution of sorts has now been adopted by members of the ISSP. It contains, for instance, rules of entry for new members and responsibilities of membership. The primary duty of each member is, of course, to run every annual module (or at least nearly every one) in the agreed format. But there are no central funds for the ISSP: each national team covers the costs of its own piloting, fieldwork, data preparation, travel to meetings, and so on.* Since the ISSP has agreed to use one language for drafting and for meetings – (British) English – there are no central translation costs.

Improbable as it may seem, this general formula has worked well so far. The annual questionnaires, for instance (contrary to all advice and experience) have actually been designed for the most part in committee, and though inevitably flawed, are no less successful than most. Admittedly this success owes a lot to careful prior development work by drafting groups and to subsequent adjustments after piloting. In any event, as the following chapters show, fascinating data are already beginning to emerge.

A fuller treatment than is given here, of the results generated so far by the series, is to be provided in the first ISSP Report, a book funded by the European Cultural Foundation and due to be published by the Netherlands Social and Cultural Planning Bureau in 1990.

As may by now be apparent, the ISSP has grown and developed somewhat haphazardly, and this pattern shows every sign of continuing as long as it seems to work. The ISSP certainly came into being without much serious planning, having emerged as a vague idea during an impromptu meeting between the two of us in 1983 whose purpose was primarily to exchange experiences and explore opportunities for borrowing each other’s questions.

At that stage the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) was still in its first year, but had just received news that it was to be given at least a four-year life span through the generosity of the Sainsbury Family Charitable Trusts. The US General Social Survey (GSS), in contrast, was some 12 years old and had already acted as something of a role-model for other national series, including the BSAS itself, the West German ALLBUS (started in 1980) and the Australian National Social Science Survey (NSSS) (which was about to undertake its first fieldwork round).

As is usual at such meetings, we were bemoaning the fact that survey questions are poor travellers, especially across national and cultural boundaries. The BSAS, for instance, despite intentions to the contrary, had managed to transplant only one or two questions directly from the GSS. The West German ALLBUS contained a few more replications as a result of a specific bilateral agreement with the GSS. But a long-standing problem for all national time-series of this sort was, and is, that the concern for year-by-year comparability within a country is often in conflict with a concern for comparability between countries. Since funding is almost always from national sources, the choice both of topics and of question-wordings tends to reflect national rather than cross-national priorities.

So the conclusion we reached in 1983 was that the ideal way of securing a greater element of cross-national comparability should probably be via a standardised bolt-on supplementary questionnaire designed specifically for that purpose. With this in mind, SCPR sought and obtained a small grant from the Nuffield Foundation for convening a meeting (and then another) between representatives of the other three national social attitudes studies with which we already had some contact – those in Australia, West Germany, and the USA. There, the idea of a bolt-on, mutually-designed series of supplementary questionnaires could be aired and, perhaps, taken further.

As it turned out, the idea was warmly received by all four groups, who also decided that these supplements should be in a self-completion format, primarily for reasons of cost and to avoid adding to the already long, personal interviews. At the following meeting, the first bolt-on module, on the role of government, was developed and scheduled for fielding in 1985. It was later translated into American English, Australian English and German to obtain functionally-equivalent rather than identical wordings.

Although we were not quite aware of it at the time, the ISSP had effectively started. Since then, several other modules have been designed and fielded, the membership has grown threefold, and the structure has become a bit more bureaucratic, but not (yet) unduly so.

*For instance, the National Science Foundation now funds the US part of the programme, and the Economic and Social Research Council now helps to fund the British part.
Difficulties of cross-national measurements

In the USA, cross-national research has been the rage for some time. This has not been the case in Britain. This could, of course, be because of British insularity — another national stereotype. But it is more plausibly the result of rather limited research funds in Britain. Cross-national surveys tend to be notoriously expensive, and as long as US funds have been deployed for the purpose, and as long as Britain had been one of the countries of interest to Americans, perhaps there had been no pressing need for Britain to get involved. But in these circumstances British concerns have not very easily got onto the agenda.

On the other hand, when one thinks of the practical and methodological problems associated with cross-national research, perhaps Britain has been right to sit largely on the sidelines. There have certainly been some spectacular failures in ambitious multi-national surveys. And even when such surveys appear to be relatively problem-free, as in the case (so far) of the ISSP, it is never altogether clear precisely what is being measured. Language differences, cultural differences, demographic differences, system differences, all serve to bedevil strict comparability between one national finding and another. It is extraordinarily difficult to be sure we are comparing like with like on almost any social variable. So why bother?

The glib answer to that question is that we cannot learn much about ourselves as a society unless we compare ourselves with others. We need data about other countries if only to become better analysts of our own condition. For instance, how 'redistributive' is our welfare system? How 'punitive' is our legal system? How 'permissive' are our constitutional systems? How 'democratic' are our political systems? How 'religious' are our people? And how 'class-conscious' are we? How 'left-wing' are our attitudes? How 'capitalistic' are our systems? And, of course, how 'tolerant' are we: how democratic, how religious, how class-conscious, how left-wing. And these are, of course, primarily the sorts of questions with which the ISSP deals.

It would be comforting to believe that all we had to do was look at the ISSP data to see whether or not there were statistically significant differences and, if so, grasp them as conclusive evidence of 'real' differences between nations. In reality, however, every difference thrown up by the survey, however large, has to be viewed initially with considerable suspicion. Might it be the language factor at work? Might it be the result of some esoteric cultural or historical cue? Moreover, the individual data analyst might not be the most appropriate person to answer these sorts of questions. Naturally, it helps a good deal to have an international team to devise the questions and comment critically on interpretations of the findings. But even close scrutiny by eminent scholars is far from infallible. For example, when the questionnaire employs a phrase such as "slightly agree", does it have the same connotation to British and American respondents, let alone, when translated, to Hungarian respondents? Who knows? But if we were to let fundamental difficulties like these get in the way, we would not embark on comparative social science measurements in the first place.

What we try to do in each module is to ensure that all questions are as culturally-neutral as possible. A large amount of time is therefore given to adjusting and fine-tuning each word and phrase so that it seems to have the greatest chance of being translated into the various languages and transplanted into the various cultures without changing its original meaning. Great attention to detail and often fine judgements are required. Even so, there are simply no sure-fire tests of whether these judgements are correct. Careful piloting helps but often fails to uncover nuances.

So we are certainly not going to try to persuade sceptics to accept the findings in this book as conclusive evidence of cross-national differences on any subject. The only claim we make for the survey results that follow is that they are a great deal more scientific and well-grounded than the national stereotypes they seek to replace.

Nor can we pretend that, in forming the ISSP, we have taken care to select countries which together represent a balanced range of world views. As we have noted, membership has depended largely on the availability in a country of a compatible team willing and able to conduct a collectively-designed national survey to a certain standard, each year. For reasons of cost, this has meant in most cases that countries have been unable to join unless they had some existing time-series, or one in prospect, capable of accommodating an ISSP module of questions. It has also meant that membership so far has been concentrated in richer countries.*

As a result of different joining dates and different start-up speeds, not all member countries have contributed data to the chapters that follow. Although one of the rules of ISSP membership is speedy archiving, Israel and Norway, for instance, have only just joined, and have not yet had time to collect data. The other nine member countries are all represented in one or more of the chapters according to the availability of their data for each module at the time of writing.

Despite the fact that recruitment to ISSP membership has been based primarily on factors such as availability and compatibility, there are nonetheless a number of interesting ways in which the member nations may be grouped for purpose of analysis. Among the eleven current members* are, for instance, seven Western European social democracies (Austria, Britain, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway and West Germany), plus Israel; there are two countries that may be classified as free-market democracies (Australia and the USA); and there is Hungary as the sole representative, for the time being, of Eastern Europe. This sort of broad three-way grouping is helpful for certain analytic purposes, as Tom W. Smith demonstrates in Chapter 4.

A second way of grouping countries is by system: citizens within federal systems represented, for instance, by the USA, Australia and West Germany, may differ on certain variables from those within unitary systems such as Britain. A third grouping may be by cultural origin: English-speaking countries with Anglo-Saxon/Celtic origins (Australia, Britain, the Republic of Ireland and the USA) may differ in some respects

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*We are pleased, however, that a team in the Philippines — the Manila-based research institute, Social Weather Stations Inc. — will be joining the ISSP in 1990.
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from, say, the countries of continental Europe. On other issues, as Stephen Harding demonstrates in Chapter 8, it is the predominant religion of a country that seems to provide the most interesting insights.

None of these dimensions can, of course, be isolated adequately without more thorough multivariate analyses than any of the authors have been able to undertake so far. With more time for analysis and more fieldwork rounds to provide supporting evidence, we may well become less diffident in future in attributing particular national differences to a country’s religion, class-structure, political system, history, language or whatever. For the moment, however, we are content to describe differences and to offer a number of competing explanations for each of them including the possibility of artefactual differences caused by measurement errors.

In addition to meticulous questionnaire design, careful piloting and sound sampling practices, an effective way of reducing the likely influence of artefactual results is to include several questions on each topic or sub-topic covered. It is always unwise to rely on any single survey question for evidence. Questionnaires should ideally be made up of groups of questions, each group designed to cover a single dimension. This is just a similar sort of precaution to that taken by insurance companies when they re-insure, or by bookies when they lay off bets. Any single question – however careful the design process has been – may in the end turn out to be fatally flawed. We need some way of discerning such flaws, particularly when cross-national comparisons are the object of the exercise.

Answers to groups of questions on a single dimension should form a pattern. If they do not, there are then only two possible reasons: either there is in fact no single dimension, or the questions selected have failed to capture it. Individual questions whose answers do not conform to the pattern are regarded as suspect. In any event, since survey analysis consists largely of trying to decipher and make sense of patterns, it depends heavily on multiple measures. That is probably why virtually all influential survey results tend to travel in convoy. Moreover, when, as in the case of some of the findings on social networks reported by Janet Finch in Chapter 5, the results travel in multinational convoy, that is even more reassuring.

The questionnaires for each of the four modules fielded between 1985 and 1988 are included in Appendix III.*

Benefits of cross-national data

Analysis of ISSP data is still in its infancy. Even so, the early results demonstrate amply that nations are not as strikingly different in the way they view things as their stereotypes imply. Some images will doubtless be confirmed, since most stereotypes, like the best lies, tend to be based on half-truths. But in general the patterns we uncover are far too complex to

$^*$We have not reproduced the questionnaires for the two studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7. They are, respectively, the British-USA comparative study on the public’s understanding of science, and the British-West German comparative study on patriotism. The relevant questions on which comparisons have been based are, however, included in the text of the two chapters.

MEASURING NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

be encapsulated in a catchy phrase or telling anecdote.

One of the great values of social science research (as opposed to casual, or even close, observation) is that in addressing questions such as whether a society is “class-bound”, or “open” or “libertarian”, or “permissive”, the researcher’s first task is to break down those fuzzy images into testable specifics. While journalists, for instance, may get away with broad, plausible generalisations, particularly about societies other than their own, social scientists are not (or should not) be allowed to. They are expected to be more rigorous and to produce evidence rather than assertions. After all, they have recourse not only to more ‘scientific’ approaches to measurement but also to representative samples of the population. That, of course, is a mixed blessing: subgroups in a population have an infuriating habit of disagreeing with each other on many issues, causing a potentially simple story to become overcomplicated.

At the risk of overstretched this point, we are going to look at a few recent observations by eminent journalists in our respective countries to see how their view of some aspects of society compares with a data-based view. (This exercise is one in which selective examples will have to do. It is certainly not ‘evidence’.) Our aim is not to disparage journalists (particularly not the ones we have chosen to quote) but to argue the case for cross-national research as an adjunct to, not as a substitute for, other methods of comparing societies. We grant that social research could never do the sort of job that foreign correspondents do in building up public knowledge and understanding of how particular societies work. Still, the best journalists – and even the best novelists – tend to be brilliant observers of perhaps one or two societies, or segments of them. They cannot be expected to have such an intimate knowledge of the way people in a wide range of societies view themselves and their worlds. For this, we suggest, everyone has to rely on comparative social statistics of one sort or another, if only to avoid being beguiled by the insights and impressions of car drivers and other such omniscient social commentators.

But, in case it still needs emphasising, we must beware of beguiling statistics too. Here is an extract from a book by New York Times journalist, Flora Lewis (1987) which examines and contrasts European nations on a number of variables, of which religion is one. She says:

The overwhelming majority (in Britain) is Protestant, and large numbers regularly go to church. The Times (London) discovered, to its surprise, that more people go to church on Sunday than to football matches on Saturday... (p.51)

This is an interesting use of comparative statistics, but is the comparison telling? To begin with, soccer spectators are overwhelmingly male, so half of the population is left out of the equation. Furthermore, virtually every British community has a church, while professional soccer grounds are concentrated in the bigger towns and cities. So, even if Lewis’s purpose had been to compare one British pastime with another, the comparison she chose would have been unhelpful. But given that her actual purpose was to make a statement about how relatively religious the British are as a nation, the comparison that matters is between the British and other nationalities. The ISSP data allow us to make just that comparison, and they certainly
do not support the impression that Lewis, via *The Times*, seeks to give.

True, among British Christians, the overwhelming majority (82%) do describe themselves as Protestant as opposed to Catholic. And true, large numbers (one in five) of people in Britain do go to church (or mosque, or synagogue, or temple) fairly regularly. But the proportion of regular churchgoers in Britain is actually smaller than that in seven of the eight ISSP countries below. Only Hungary has a (much) smaller proportion than Britain’s, as the figures show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attendance Rate (Monthly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, an obvious indicator of the cultural importance of religion in a society is the proportion of people who profess *no religion* at all. On this measure, Britain appears to be very indifferent to religion, surpassed only by the Netherlands. Over one in three Britons say they have no religion, against a maximum of one in ten, for five of the other six countries for which we have data. (Hungarian data are missing here because they ask about baptism rather than belief.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion saying “no religion”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving from religion to another subject on which we have cross-national data, we are able once again to compare conventional wisdom with survey findings. Here we cite an article by American journalist James Atlas, writing in the influential Sunday magazine of the *New York Times* (Atlas, 1989). Discussing attacks on free speech in Britain, the tone of the article is conveyed by its title, “Thatcher puts a lid on”. A key point in the article is that the British public, unlike the American public, does not care much about freedom of speech. To buttress this point, Atlas quotes a former London correspondent of the *New York Times* as follows:

Listening to speech after speech in the drafty hall (in London) I remembered something the American columnist Anthony Lewis had told me before I left: ‘The issues that make us rise in passion don’t move the English’. Which doesn’t make them any less important, I thought.

This view seems uncontroversial enough until one examines the available data. The ISSP 1985 survey contained six items which specifically ‘tested’ people’s commitment to civil liberties in circumstances where there was an element of tension between the right to free expression and the possible need for restraint. We show below the basic proportions in Britain and the USA who would allow each form of free expression. The ordering of the items – in terms of how libertarian our respondents were – was the same in the two countries, and we present them in descending order of ‘libertarianism’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Britain %</th>
<th>USA %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of people to publish pamphlets to protest against a government action they strongly oppose</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of people to organise protest marches and demonstrations against a government action they strongly oppose</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of a newspaper to publish confidential government papers about the government’s economic plans</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of people who believe that whites are racially superior to other races to hold public meetings to express their views</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of people to organise a nationwide strike of all workers to protest against a government action they strongly oppose</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of a newspaper to publish confidential government papers about the government’s defence plans</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So, on five of the six items the British appear, after all, to be more ‘passionate’ than the Americans in their defence of free speech. And on the sixth item – defending the right of racists to hold public meetings to express their views – it is far from clear on which side a ‘liberal’ would actually come to rest. Again, it seems a representative dataset based on multiple items within more than one country serves to throw doubt on conventional wisdom about national attributes.

Of course we realise that different questions would have come up with different results and, for that matter, that different journalists would have come to different conclusions (see, for instance, Lewis, 1987 p.40). But no matter: all we are trying to emphasise is that the picture across nations is
always a great deal more complicated than either the most plausible anecdote or the single poll question might suggest.

We could be accused of having chosen two subjects for these arguments on which we knew we were on strong ground. (In fact we chose two subjects which were not covered elsewhere in this book.) But let us nonetheless touch on a third and final subject on which, surely, conventional wisdom and systematic data coincide: the unique, class-bound character of British attitudes and behaviour. Take Anthony Sampson for instance, writing about the effect of the British education system which, he says,

reinforces and perpetuates a class system whose divisions run through all British institutions, separating language, attitude and motivations (Sampson, 1982).

The same sort of point is made by Sampson’s Observer colleague, Robert Chesshyre (1988) and by numerous others. At its simplest, everyone agrees that the British class system is almost uniquely powerful (and bad) in contrast with, say, the American one which is almost invisible (and good). But what exactly do these sorts of blanket comparisons imply? They could mean one or more of the following possibilities, each of which could be tested against data:

- that the British social structure is much like everyone else’s (see Erikson et al., 1982), but that the British are more aware of it. (It is said that Eskimos have forty different words for snow.)
- that the British social structure is different. Britain has social divisions, other countries do not have.
- that the British social structure overall is much like everyone else’s but that mobility within it is less frequent or more difficult than in other countries.
- that one’s social class in Britain influences one’s attitudes and behaviour more than it does in other countries (see Vanneman and Cannon (1987) for instance, on the strong links between class and party affiliation in Britain in comparison with others in other countries, especially the USA.)

Chapter 4 reports on aspects of these issues, so we will not rehearse these details here. Suffice to say that Britain does not come out especially high as a class-conscious or class-bound society, at least not consistently so, in comparison with the other ISSP nations. In fact in most respects, Britain is somewhere in the middle of the league, not very different from the USA.

Even as far as social mobility is concerned, Britain is nowhere near the extreme, but somewhere around the average of the ISSP nations. The ISSP 1987 module contained a number of questions to find out about intergenerational mobility, using both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measures. But there are other data available on this subject too. The reality is, first, that national variation in upward mobility is small; second, that Britain is in the middle of the ‘league table’; third, the USA has only slightly greater upward mobility between generations than Britain does (see also Ganzeboom et al., 1988). Americans (and Australians) do seem to be more optimistic than others about their chance for upward mobility, but it is their optimism, not the reality, which distinguishes them in our data.

These results may seem surprising, but similar conclusions have been reported in the technical and scholarly literature for some time. Intergenerational occupational mobility patterns in industrial societies are remarkably similar. But there remains a disconcerting gap between these well-established findings of contemporary social science and public discussion - even ‘informed’ public discussion - of the issue.

In summary, when we examine whether or not the British class system is unique, and when we base such an examination on multiple measures within several countries, the answer we get is emphatic. Although there are aspects of the British class structure - for instance the abiding relationship between social class and political party - which set it aside from most (but by no means all) other countries, there are not that many. Such differences as there are have been talked up, as much by British observers as by anyone else.

Conclusion

Public attitudes are as much a part of social reality as are behaviour patterns, social conditions or demographic characteristics. Some social attitudes are also no less slow to change. Yet their rigorous measurement, particularly across nations, has never been accorded a very high priority.* The ISSP is, we hope, helping to rectify this omission.

No attempt is made in any of the chapters that follow to provide anything approaching an exhaustive analysis of the data available. They contain only a first glance at a large and complicated dataset. As we have said, a second glance - via the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau - is expected soon, and the data themselves have been deposited in archives for others to quarry.

At a minimum the guided tour that follows, based as it is on random sampling and careful data collection, should provide sounder and subtler insights into the attitudes of different nations, including one’s own than the classical grand tour could ever do. On the other hand, to the extent that most of us seem to cherish our myths and stereotypes about other nations, it could prove to be an uncomfortable journey.

*Although principally about contrasting social attitudes, the dataset also contains numerous background details about people’s characteristics and behaviour in order to place attitudes within a wider social context. Where possible we try to standardise those details between countries, but there are inevitable difficulties especially in measures of social class.
Notes

1. Currently, national teams participating in ISSP are:
   - Australia: Department of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra.
   - Austria: Sozialer Survey Österreich, Institut für Soziologie der Universität Graz, Graz.
   - Britain: Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), London.
   - Hungary: Társsadalom kutatási Informatikai Egyesület (TARKI), Budapest.
   - Ireland: Department of Social Sciences, University College, Dublin.
   - Israel: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv.
   - Italy: EURISCO Ricerca Sociale e di Marketing, Milan.
   - Netherlands: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Rijswijk.
   - Norway: National Committee for Survey Research, and the Norsk Samfunnsvidenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD), Bergen.
   - USA: National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, Chicago.
   - West Germany: Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA), Mannheim.

The ISSP is administered through its secretariat at SCPR in London. All enquiries may be addressed there.

The ISSP’s archive and computing adviser is the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) at the University of Cologne. For further details, see Appendix I.

Five modules have been fielded so far (though not by all the countries listed above, and not always in the calendar year for which the module was designed.

1985: The role of government
1986: Family networks and support systems
1987: Social inequality
1988: Women and the family
1989: Work orientations

In 1990, the group plans to repeat a subset of items from the “role of government” module. In 1991, it plans to field a module on religion and religious belief.

2. In Chapter 2, Swiss data have also been included, even though Switzerland is not one of the ISSP member nations. In 1987 the Soziologisches Institut der Universität Zurich fielded a questionnaire replicating the 1987 ISSP module on social inequality. See Appendix I for full details.

References


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